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Congress on Revolution in Southern Africa at Oxford last 
March. The author is a leader of the movement for libera­
tion in South Africa.
T H E  W HOLE of that part of Southern Africa which is con­
trolled by racial minorities is experiencing either consistent and 
regular guerilla activity or is faced with advanced preparation for 
its commencement.
Angola1 was followed by Mozambique2 and they by South 
West A frica3. For Portugal (already extended by the brilliantly 
successful operation PAIGC in its West African colony of Guinea 
Bissao) the problem of guerilla operations in its territories is 
beginning to assume the proportions of a m ajor crisis. Early 
this year Salazar, speaking of Angola and Mozambique, conceded 
that “if the troubles there continue very much longer, they will 
diminish and destroy our ability to carry on.” 4
And now the guerilla front against foreign and minority 
rule has been extended to Rhodesia where since August 13, 1967, 
guerilla units of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) 
and Rhodesia’s Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) have 
been involved in armed clashes with South African and Rhodesian 
military forces5. T h e  official admission of government losses of 
8 dead and 14 wounded in these early engagements is disputed 
by the ANC and ZAPU, and appears to be an underestim ation in 
the light of the reported num ber of casualties which filled 
Rhodesian hospitals. Despite early attempts to denigrate the 
calibre of the guerilla forces, the scale of the fighting, the tenacity 
of the guerillas in hand-to-hand combat, and the effectiveness 
and sophisticated quality of some of the ambushes even at this 
early stage, were a pointer to future possibilities6.
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ANC-ZAPU ALLIANCE
According to press announcements, the collaboration between 
ANC and ZAPU guerilla forces was not coincidental bu t was 
part of jo in t planned action in the sense that “the fighting that 
is presently going on in the W ankie area is indeed being carried 
out by a combined force of ZAPU and ANC which marched into 
the country as comrades-in-arms on a common route, each bound 
to its destination. I t is the determ ination of these combined 
forces to fight the common settler enemy to the finish, at any point 
of encounter as they make their way to their respective fighting 
zones.” 7 This alliance has its historical roots in  a situation 
which, in many fundamental respects, is common to both peoples. 
Rhodesia under Smith is more and more embracing the South 
African type political framework. Its survival in the face of a 
moderate am ount of international pressure is almost undoubtedly 
due to the considerable bolstering up of its economy by South 
Africa. T his same role of saviour of “white civilisation” in 
Rhodesia is being played by South Africa in  the military field.
It is reasonable to inter that if the Smith group could have 
avoided calling in South African troops to cope with the first 
batch of guerillas it would have preferred to do so. As it is, it 
lays itself open to the charge that its capacity to muster sufficient 
internal support to deal with this type of situation is suspect. And 
indeed it is inconceivable that, in the long run, this micro-com­
m unity of 200,000 whites could muster either sufficient resources or 
morale to cope with a growing guerilla movement which would 
in varying degrees gain the allegiance of the politically deprived 
4 million Africans.
T he presence of the S.A. regime’s armed forces on Rhodesian 
soil is an indication (if another is really needed) that the minority 
regimes in the whole of Southern Africa have come to regard 
the survival of white rule as indivisible. In this sense, South 
Africa’s strategic borders are more and more conceived as extend­
ing to the northernmost parts of Angola, Mozambique and 
Rhodesia.8 In  this sense too there must be an extremely im portant 
strategic connection between the efforts of the guerilla forces in 
every part of occupied Southern Africa; and we can therefore 
expect increasing collaboration between all the organisations in 
the area which stand at the head of people’s armed units.
T he enormity of the task facing ANC guerillas within South 
Africa itself gave rise previously to suggestions that the libera­
tion of Southern Africa should be approached as a project to be 
achieved in geographic stages — first Mozambique, then Angola 
and in the end South Africa. This strategy appears never to have
62
AUSTRALIAN LEFT  REVIEW Oct.-Nov., 1968
found favour in the ANC or in any of the other liberatory move­
ments: and for good reason. There can be little doubt that 
when Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique reaches a crisis 
point, Salazar’s friends in South Africa (looking to their own 
future) will intervene on a massive scale. T h eir capacity to do 
so, and their capacity to meet m ounting military pressures in 
Rhodesia, will in part be dependent upon events within their 
own country and in particular, on the extent to which the South 
African guerilla probes take root and menace internal stability. 
Similarly, every victory in Angola, Mozambique, South West Africa 
and Rhodesia, brings with it untold psychological and m aterial 
advantages for armed units operating within the Republic of S.A.
SO U TH  AFRICAN GUERILLAS
T he ANC has not attem pted to hide the fact that its guerillas 
are in the process of m aking their way to their own fighting zone. 
An underground leaflet —  “We Are At W ar” — distributed re­
cently by the ANC’s illegal apparatus within South Africa, talks 
of the Rhodesian battles and states: “Soon there will be battles 
in South Africa. We will fight until we have won, however long 
it takes and however much it will cost.”
Is this idle talk? T he inherent weakness of the Smith group 
atid the Portuguese and their vulnerability to organised military 
insurrection is patent. Can the same be said of South Africa at 
this stage? Is it not being too sanguine to expect a successful 
outcome to armed confrontation between the very considerable 
resources and weapons of the white-controlled South African state 
and the inexperienced lightly-armed guerillas? W here are the 
sanctuary-providing and logistically im portant friendly borders? 
W here are the Sierra Maestras, the jungles, the swamps, the 
paddy fields?
These questions have reference to the sort of model which has 
been built up over the years in people’s minds of the ideal and 
classical type set of conditions which make guerilla operations 
a feasible proposition and they undoubtedly have an im portant 
place in any serious assessment of its prospects. But we must 
not overdo historical analogy. There is in  fact no classical 
type model of physical conditions to which successful guerilla 
struggle conforms. Different geographical factors call for different 
methods and forms of guerilla struggle.’ I shall re turn  to this.
PO LITICA L PREREQU ISITES
T he only universal prerequisites are to be sought in the general 
political situation rather than in physical or geographic factors. 
Given a colonial-type situation, armed struggle becomes feasible 
if and only if the following political conditions are present:
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Firstly, a disillusionment on the part of the majority of the 
people with the prospect of achieving its liberation by traditional 
and non-violent processes.
Secondly, a readiness on the part of the people to respond 
in varying degrees and ways to the call for armed confrontation 
— from actually joining the guerillas, to making their path 
easy and that of the enemy hard .10
Thirdly, the existence of a political leadership capable not 
only of gaining the organised allegiance of the people for armed 
struggle, bu t having also the ability to carry out the painstaking 
process of planning, preparation and overall direction of the 
conduct of operations.
A final judgm ent on the extent to which the present South 
African situation conforms to these requisites needs a little more 
than formal statistical and analytical equipment. I t requires 
assessments by indigenous political activists who know and under­
stand not only the demonstrable facts but who, in addition, have 
a “feel” for their people, a sensitivity to their mood and the sort 
of revolutionary instinct which enables them at every given stage 
to differentiate between the possible and the fanciful.
These qualities are nurtured by years of intim ate political 
nexus between a leader, a people and a situation. W e must 
approach with extreme caution the attem pts of outsiders (how­
ever well-motivated) whether it be in  Africa or Latin America, 
to legislate for others in this respect. In  South Africa, as in all 
other countries, a true assessment of these factors is primarily 
the function of the fiberatory organisations and their leaders.
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS
Of course, favourable conditions for armed struggle ripen 
historically. But the historical process must not be approached as 
if it were a mystical thing ,outs;ide of man which in a crude 
deterministic sort of way sets him tasks to which he responds. In 
this sense to sit back and wait for the evolvement of objective 
conditions which constitute a “revolutionary situation” amounts 
in some cases to a dereliction of leadership duties. W hat people 
expressing themselves in organised activity, do or abstain from 
doing, hastens or retards the historical process and helps or 
hinders the creation of favourable conditions for armed struggle. 
Indeed in one sense the process of creating favorable conditions 
for m ilitary struggle does not end until the day of victory. Given 
commencement and sustaining of guerilla activity operates as an 
extremely im portant factor in creating more favourable conditions 
for eventual victory. But it is not the sole factor." O ther forms
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of mass activity, including those inspired by the successes of the 
guerilla units, also play a vital role.
Of course, no political struggle (and this is what guerilla 
struggle essentially is) can be taken up only on condition of 
infallibly favourable chances.12 It does not however follow that 
licence must be given for every act of adventurism, irresponsibility 
and ‘trying your luck.’
There is not a single serious segment of the organised liberatory 
movement which does not believe that, in a general sense, political 
conditions in South Africa are favourable for the commencement 
and development of armed struggle. This does not necessarily 
imply a belief that there exists at the moment a classical type revo­
lutionary situation, with an all-round revolutionary insurrection 
as an immediate possibility.
M ILITANCY IN  T H E  TOW NS
Is there evidence that the course upon which the ANC has 
embarked has a political basis in the existing South African 
situation? There is, I believe, abundant evidence that it has.
T he Africans of South Africa have a history which is rich in 
resistance to alien rule not only in the initial period of colonisa­
tion, but also in the last few decades when it reached new heights. 
T he people have over and over again demonstrated their capacity 
to act at a most sophisticated political level.
T he 50s and the early 60s witnessed four impressive nation­
wide general strikes all called by the ANC and its allies. T he 
significance of these strikes should not be underestimated. On 
each occasion, hundreds of thousands of urban workers risked their 
jobs and their consequent right to remain in an urban area, in 
-quest not of reforms, not for better working conditions, but in 
response to a purely political call to demonstrate a dem and for 
votes, opposition to racial laws, and so on. In  the face of repres­
sion Trade U nion organisation was m inim al — and the above 
responses were im portant pointers to the high level of political 
consciousness which a half-century of urbanisation combined with 
vigorous political leadership had inculcated into the townspeople. 
T here are many more examples to be found in the 50s and 60s 
which illustrate the capacity of those in the urban areas to react 
impressively to calls for action involving both tenacity and 
sacrifice: the Defiance Campaign of 1952-53, the bus boycotts 
of the late 50s, women’s resistance against the extension of pass 
laws to women, the pre-Sharpeville anti-pass campaigns.
And what of the people in the countryside, which is the focal 
point of guerilla activity in the initial stages? Here too there
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is convincing evidence of a peasantry which despite centuries of 
intensive repression, lacks submissiveness. In the very recent 
past and in  many im portant areas it has demonstrated a capacity 
for action to the point of armed resistance. In Sekhukhuniland 
(Transvaal) in the late 50s the peasantry, partly armed, doggedly 
resisted the attempts by the authorities to  replace the traditional 
leaders of the people with government-appointed servants, so- 
called Bantu Authorities. In Zululand similar resistance was 
encountered. T he most intense point of peasant resistance and 
upsurge was amongst the Pondo in the Transkei. By March, 
1960 a vast popular movement had arisen, unofficial administrative 
units were set up including people’s courts. From the chosen 
spots in the mountains where thousands of peasants assembled 
illegally came the name of the movement — ‘INTABA’ — T he 
M ountain. Although this revolt had its origin in local grievances, 
the aim of the resistance soon became the attainm ent of basic 
political ends and it came to adopt the full programme of the 
ANC.13
W hat is also significant about many of these actions in the 
countryside is that despite the traditionally strict legal sanction 
against the possession by non-whites of any arms or ammunition, 
they always manage on appropriate occasions to emerge with 
an assortment of prohibited weapons in their hands.
These then are pointers to the validity of the claim by the 
ANC that the African majority of the country can be expected 
to respond in growing numbers to a lead which holds out real 
prospects of destroying white supremacy, albeit in a long and pro­
tracted war. T he conviction held by all African political group­
ings (except those sponsored by the government) that the white 
state can be shifted by nothing short of violence, reflects what is 
today both an incontrovertible objective fact and a belief held 
by a majority of ordinary people both in  town and countryside.
OBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES
If then all these subjective elements in the situation tend to 
argue in favour of the ANC decision, what about some of the 
formidable objective difficulties? On the face of it the enemy 
of the guerilla is in stable command of a rich and varied economy 
which, even at the stage when it is not required to extend itself, 
can afford a military budget of £186 million. He has a relatively 
well-trained and efficient army and police force. He can draw 
on considerable manpower resources because he has the support 
of the million privileged whites who can be expected to fight 
with great ferocity and conviction (albeit one that is born of 
economic aggrandisem ent).
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In  addition. South Africa has very inffuential and powerful 
friends. In a situation of crisis these friends may well lose their 
existing public inhibitions to openly associate with and bolster 
up the racist regime.
If there is one lesson that the history of guerilla struggles has 
taught, it is that the m aterial strength and resources of the 
enemy is by no means a decisive factor.
Witness the resources at the disposal of the French in Algeria; 
at the height of the fighting 600,000 troops were supplied and 
serviced by a leading industrial nation whose economy was quite 
outside the reach of m ilitary operations. In terms of pure material 
strengfh and almost limitless resources, can anyone surpass the 
USA in Vietnam? And no amount of modern industrial backing, 
technical know-how or fire power appears to sway the balance 
in favour of the invaders. W hat about the spectacle of Grivas 
and his Cyprus group challenging the British Army with 47 
rifles. 27 automatic weapons and 7 revolvers? (“It was with these 
arms and these alone, that I kept the fight going for almost a 
year without any appreciable reinforcements”) 14
The answer lies in this. Guerilla warfare, almost by definition, 
posits a situation in  which there is a vast imbalance of material 
and military resources between the opposing sides. I t is designed 
to cope with a situation in which the enemy is infinitely superior 
in relation to every conventional factor of warfare. It is par 
excellence the weapon ,of the materially weak against the materially 
strong.
GUERILLA TACTICS
Given its popular character and given a populace which in­
creasingly sides with and shields the guerilla whilst at the same 
time opposing and exposing the enemy, the survival and growth 
of, a people’s army is assured by a skilful exercise of tactics. 
Surprise, mobility and tactical retreat make it  difficult for the 
enemy to bring into play its superior fire-power in any decisive 
battles. No individual battle is fought under circumstances un­
favourable to the guerilla. Superior forces can be harassed, weak­
ened and, in the end, destroyed.
“There is a saying: ‘the guerilla is the maverick of war’.
He practises deception, treachery, surprise and night operations.
Thus, circumstances and the will to win often oblige him to
forget rom antic and sportsmanlike 'concepts. . . . Some disparag­
ing people call this ‘h it and ru n ’. T h at is exactly what it is!
H it and run, wait, stalk the enemy, h it him  again and run
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. . . perhaps this smacks of not facing up  to the enemy. Never­
theless, it serves the goal of guerilla warfare: to conquer and
destroy the enemy.” ,5
T he absence of an orthodox front, of fighting lines; the need 
of the enemy to attenuate his resources and lines of communica­
tion over vast areas; his need to protect the widely scattered in­
stallations on which his economy is dependent (because the 
guerilla pops up now here now th e re ): These are amongst the 
factors which serve in  the long ru n  to compensate in favour of 
the guerilla for the disparity in the starting strength of the 
adversaries. I stress the words ‘in the long run,’ because it 
would be idle to dispute the considerable military advantages to 
the enemy of his high level of industrialisation, his ready-to-hand 
reserves of white manpower and his excellent roads, railways and 
air transport which facilitates swift manoeuvres and speedy con­
centration of personnel.
But we must also not overlook the fact that over a period 
of time many of these very same unfavourable factors will begin 
to operate in favour of the liberation force:—
(a) T he ready-to-hand resources including food production 
depend overwhelmingly upon non-white labour which, with the 
growing intensity of the struggle, will not remain docile and 
co-operative.
(b) T he white manpower resources may seem adequate initially 
but must become dangerously stretched as guerilla warfare de­
velops. Already extremely short of skilled labour — the monopoly 
of the whites — the mobilisation of a large force for a protracted 
struggle would place a further burden on the workings of the 
economy.
(c) In  contrast to many other m ajor guerilla struggles (Cuba 
is one of the exceptions) the enemy’s economic and manpower 
resources are all situated within the theatre of war and there is 
no secure external pool (other than direct intervention by a 
foreign state) safe from sabotage, mass action and guerilla action 
on which the enemy can draw.
(d) T he very sophisticated character of the economy with its 
well-developed system of communication makes it a much more 
vulnerable target. In an underdeveloped country the interruption 
of supplies to any given region may be no more than a local 
setback. In  a highly sensitive modern economic structure of 
the South African type, the successful harassment of transport 
to any m ajor industrial complex would inevitably inflict immense 
damage to the economy as a whole and to the morale of the 
enemy. (The South African forces would have the task of keeping
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intact about 30,000 miles of railway line spread over an area of 
over 400,000 square miles!)
TER R A IN  AND FRIENDLY BORDERS
One of the more popular misconceptions concerning guerilla 
warfare is that a physical environment which conforms to a 
special pattern is indispensable — thick jungle, inaccessible m oun­
tain ranges, swamps, a friendly border and so forth. T he avail­
ability of this sort of terrain is, of course, of tremendous ad­
vantage to the guerillas especially in the early non-operational 
phase when training and other preparatory steps are undertaken 
and no external bases are available for this purpose. W hen the 
operations commence, the guerilla cannot survive, let alone flourish, 
unless he moves to areas where people live and work and where 
the enemy can be engaged in combat. If he is fortunate enough 
to have behind him a friendly border or area of difficult access 
which can provide temporary refuge, it is of course advantage­
ous, although it sometimes brings with it its own set of problems 
Connected mainly with supplies.16 But guerilla warfare can, and 
has been, waged in every conceivable type of terrain, in deserts, 
in swamps, in farm fields, in built-up areas, in plains, in the 
bush and in countries w ithout friendly borders.
The sole question is one of adjusting survival tactics to the 
sort of terrain in which operations have to be carried out.
In any case in the vast expanse that is South Africa, a people’s 
force will find a m ultitude of variations in topography; deserts, 
m ountain forests, veld, and swamps. There might not appear to 
be a single impregnable Sierra Maestra or im penetrable jungle, 
but the country abounds in terrain which in general is certainly 
no less favourable for guerilla operations than some of the terrain 
in which the Algerians or the resistance movements in occupied 
Europe operated. T ito , when told that a certain area was “as level 
as the palm of your hand and with very little forests,” retorted: 
“W hat a first-class example it is of tne relative unim portance 
of geographical factors in the development of a rising.”
In  particular South Africa’s tremendous size will make it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the white regime to keep 
the v.’hole of it under armed surveillance in strength and in depth. 
Hence, an early development of a relatively safe (though shifting) 
rear is not beyond the realm of possibility. T he undetected 
existence of the SWAPO training camp for over a year and, 
more especially, the survival for years in the m ountains and hills 
in the Transkei of the leaders of ‘In taba’ during the military 
occupation of the area after the 1960 Pondo Revolt, are both of 
importance in this context.
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1 First outbreaks of organized violence occurred in M arch 1961. Various factors 
including division in the guerilla ranks, and events in the Congo (which accom­
m odated considerable guerilla reserves) enabled the  Portuguese tem porarily  to 
render ineffective a m ovem ent which a t its he igh t had  thousands of guerillas 
in  the field and  h ad  gained control of considerable territo ry  in  the  N orth. In 
the last few years a re grouping has taken place and once again there  is evidence 
of guerilla activity on a num ber of fronts.
2 T h e  arm ed struggle in M ozambique was launched in Septem ber 1964, by Fre- 
limo, an am algam ation of several earlier m ovements. Dr. E duardo M andlanc, 
the  President of Frelim o, claims to control a fifth of the  country (N orthern 
districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado). T h ere  are reported  to be 50.000 P or­
tuguese troops in Mozambique.
3 According to  evidence which emerged in the  recent tria l in Pretoria, South 
W est African guerillas under the control of th e  South West African People’s 
Organization (SWAPO) established a train ing  cam p in the  territory  in 1965 which 
operated  undetected for close on a year.
4 Q uoted in  an  editorial in  the Johannesburg  R a n d  Daily M ail, 6 January  1966.
5 According to  press reports the m ain areas of operations appear to have been 
a t W ankie, Zambesi River Valley, N orthern  M atabeleland, and the D istrict of B u l­
awayo, West of the Livingstone Bulawayo railway, U rungw e district and the  Siplilo 
district. T h e  biggest clash lasting 48 hours appears to have been a t T jo lo tje . T he 
usual ploy of describing the jo in t efforts of the  Vorster-Smith arm ed forces as a 
‘police action’ is open to question when regard  is had  to facts like the  use of 
H u n te r jets, arm ed helicopters etc.
6 R eport of Lawrence Fellow, New York Tim es, 5 October 1967.
7 Statem ent issued on 19 August 1967 by Oliver T am bo, Deputy President of the 
ANC, and J. R. D. Chikerem a, Vice-President of ZAPU.
8 FRELIM O  has for long claimed th a t South Africa has been helping to arm  
and tra in  the Portuguese; also th a t whites from South Africa have been fighting 
in the Portuguese units. In  October 1967 the  South African Foreign M inister 
spoke of ‘m u tu a l security arrangem ents’ betw een South Africa and the  o ther 
states in  Southern Africa.
9 Che Guevara, Guerilla Warfare, C hapter 1.
10 Leaflet, W e Are A t War, issued by the ANC in  South Africa.
11 Debray, R evolu tion  in the R evolution, tends to proceed from the  proposition 
th a t “the most im portan t form of propaganda is m ilitary  action,’’ to a conclusion 
th a t in most of L atin  America the creation of m ilitary  skilled guerilla foci is suffi­
cient to b ring  about favourable conditions for an eventual people’s m ilitary 
victory. T h u s he  underrates the vital connection betw een the guerilla  struggle 
(which in  its early stages m ust of necessity be of a lim ited  m agnitude) and o ther 
forms of m ilitan t mass activity. He sees the  FOCI (which in term s of his approach 
m ust assume overall political as well as m ilitary  leadership) as having (certainly 
in the  in itial phases) to cut itself off from the  local population . T here  are m any 
indications, including the increasing devotion of resources to mass illegal p ro p a­
ganda th ro ughou t the  country, th a t the ANC’s approach on this im portan t ques­
tion is different.
12 “W orld history would indeed be very easy to m ake if the struggle were taken 
up only on  condition of infallibly favourable chances” — Karl M arx in a  letter 
to L. Kugelman, 17 April 1871.
13 A detailed description of these events and th e ir significance is contained in  
South Africa: T h e  Peasants’ R evolt by Govan Mbeki; Penguin African Library.
14 The M emoirs of General Grivas (Longmans), p.22.
15 In troduction  to Guerilla Warfare, Mao Tse T ung .
16 Che G uevara, Guerilla Warfare, p p .120-125.
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